Europenii sunt de pe Marte si americanii de pe Venus?

Redau mai jos contribuția mea la solicitarea Consiliului Atlantic al SUA privind situația din Libia in forma unitara. (Poate fi găsită impartita la urmatoarele link-uri:
http://www.acus.org/
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato-libya-roundtable-command-and-control
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato-libya-roundtable-more-martial-europe
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato-libya-roundtable-endgame)

„Europeans are from Mars and the Americans from Venus?

Ioan Mircea Pascu

Libya indicates that, if all politics is local, all politics is internal, too, particularly in times of world crisis. If Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2002-2003 were NATO actions based on a commonality of purpose, Libya, on the contrary, is based, paradoxically, on a variety of national interests not fully convergent.

Consequently, from its legal foundation – the UNSC Resolution 1973 – to its actual implementation (who strikes what) it bears the sign of vagueness, so as to allow the coalition members to move freely in meeting those particular national interests.

Therefore, the recent decision of NATO to assume command of the operation is welcome, because it would (expectedly) bring more cohesion on the ground.

The truth is that, for a variety of reasons, some coalition members were more interested than the others to see the military operation started.

That is the main reason why its final aim is not clear: it could either be to deny Qaddafi the capacity to harm his own people – as exclusively permitted by the UNSC Resolution – (which would practically stop the current waive of revolt – and its unpredictable consequences – in Northern Africa and beyond), or it could be to oust him – as indicated by both the European and US leaders – (and thus give a jolt to the same waive, in spite of all those unpredictable consequences)._

As for the Euro-Atlantic institutions, the European Council of 11 March 2011 has managed to only illustrate once again the distance between the EU vigorous rhetoric and its internal indecision when it comes to action, thus seriously questioning “en passant” the ECSD policy, too.

The apparently too high bar set through the three conditions for an intervention has been unexpectedly lowered when the people of Cairo pressured the Arab League to convey to the UN its accord for the imposition of a “No-Fly Zone”.

Apparently, that determined the US to abandon their initial reluctance and allow for a military intervention. Given their “full plate” internationally, difficult internal problems and desire to distance from the legacy of the previous Administration, the attitude of the US is understandable, even if the expectations for leadership in the Alliance, high too, were not fulfilled completely. (I wonder if a re-visitation of the US position on the Anglo-French 1956 intervention in Egypt might not, possibly, offer us additional clues).

NATO, whose internal difficulties in achieving consensus have been exposed, too, in the end, managed to get an agreement and thus achieve the minimum degree of unity to permit the execution of its command role.

However, that might prove a more difficult and delicate task than in other cases, given the variety of interests on which the current Libyan operation is based. The need for political harmonization will, therefore, be paramount in achieving the necessary agreement for commanding it.

As for the Central Europe’s “silence”, I think that it might be possibly motivated by a number of factors:
Libya is a subject of interest to a limited number of western allies, not to the entire Alliance as such;
The US are holding back; (it would be sadly ironical if the US, willing to provide leadership even when not all wanted it only a decade ago, would be reluctant to do so now, when many would feel the need for it)
Libya is a contested issue; and
Central Europe’s current internal problems leave little space for other than political support to prevent bringing the Alliance to a halt.

However, I do not think that Central Europe has lost its profound interest in NATO remaining a strong alliance providing for their collective defense. Therefore, I am sure that, if the current Libyan operation might affect negatively that interest, Central European allies will speak up.”